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Abstract
Frustrated with lackluster momentum in the WTO Doha Round and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and 
mindful of free trade agreement (FTA) networks centered on the United States and Europe, Asian countries have joined the FTA game. 
By 2005, Asian countries (excluding China) had ratified 14 bilateral and regional FTAs and had negotiated but not implemented another 
seven. Asian nations are also actively negotiating some 23 bilateral and regional FTAs, many with non-Asian partners, including Australia, 
Canada, Chile, the European Union, India, and Qatar. China has been particularly active since 2000. It has completed three bilateral 
FTAs—Thailand in 2003 and Hong Kong and Macao in 2004—and is initiating another 17 bilateral and regional FTAs. However, a 
regional Asian economic bloc led by China seems distant, even though China accounts for about 30 percent of regional GDP. As in 
Europe and the Western Hemisphere, many Asian countries are pursuing FTAs with countries outside the region. On present evidence, 
the FTA process embraced with some enthusiasm in Asia, Europe, and the Western Hemisphere more closely resembles fingers reaching 
idiosyncratically around the globe rather than politico-economic blocs centered respectively on Beijing, Brussels, and Washington.
Note: This paper was written for and presented at the RAND–China Reform Forum conference in June 2005.
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According to the Sutherland Report (2005), commissioned by the director-general of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), about 150 preferential trade agreements (PTAs) are in force, and the 
number is expected to double by 2007.1 Among the major powers, the United States is leading the 
current drive for PTAs. Once the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was 
implemented in January 1994, the Clinton administration pushed bilateral, regional, and global trade 
deals simultaneously. After 2000, the Bush administration embraced a strategy of “competitive 
liberalization,” which led to seven completed free trade agreements (FTAs) with 12 countries—
Jordan, Chile, Australia, Singapore, Morocco, Bahrain, and six small countries in Central America and 
the Caribbean (the Central American Free Trade Agreement–Dominican Republic, CAFTA-DR).2 
Another eight bilateral and regional agreements are under negotiation, and an additional eight have 
been proposed (see table 1). The economic case for bilateral agreements is hotly debated: They are 
criticized for “spaghetti-bowl” complexity, “trade diversion,” and “attention diversion” (from the 
WTO system). In this paper, we will not rehearse the familiar arguments, pro and con. We do note, 
however, that FTAs are not purely an instrument of commercial policy. Foreign policy objectives are 
always important, and the post-NAFTA flurry of bilateral agreements is no exception.  
The European Union has long used FTAs as a foreign policy tool, both as a way of 
preparing potential members for accession and as a means of extending EU influence to more distant 
countries.3 While recent “out-of-area” EU FTAs are generally less comprehensive than US FTAs, 
since 2000 the European Union has concluded 12 bilateral FTAs with non-European countries, 
including Chile; Egypt; Jordan; Lebanon; Mexico; Morocco; and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific 
(ACP) countries.4 Seven bilateral and regional agreements are under negotiation and another six have 
been proposed (see table 2). In comparison with the US FTA strategy, however, the European Union 
                                                 
1 Currently, PTAs cover half the world trade; see Pangestu and Gooptu (2003).  
2 The nine completed free trade agreements (FTAs) include those that are signed but not yet ratified (Bahrain 
and CAFTA-DR).   
3 In the 1990s, the European Union signed bilateral trade agreements, known as Europe Agreements, with 10 
EU candidate countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, and Slovenia. In May 2004, most of these Central European countries joined the European 
Union. Another set of EU trade agreements seeks to embrace Southeast Europe. Under the Stability Pact for 
Southeastern Europe, the European Union aims to establish FTAs with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Macedonia, and Serbia and Montenegro. These FTAs are labeled Stabilization and Association 
Agreements, and in this paper we consider them as out-of-area FTAs. So far, two are in force, with Macedonia 
(2004) and Croatia (2005).  
4 According to Brenton and Manchin (2002), recent EU trade agreements have restrictions that belie the EU 
slogan of “Everything but Arms.”  
  2places less emphasis on “competitive liberalization” and somewhat more weight on region-to-region 
agreements and multilateral WTO talks.5  
Frustrated with the slow pace of the Doha Round and lackluster momentum in the Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and mindful of US- and EU-centered FTA networks, 
Asian countries have joined the FTA game. FTAs in Asia began as regional groupings, starting with 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967 and later with APEC in 1989, but 
these have made limited progress in reducing significant trade barriers. In the late 1990s, many Asian 
nations shifted from a single-minded emphasis on the multilateral WTO system to a consideration of 
FTAs as part of their trade-negotiating strategy. By 2005, Asian countries (excluding China) had 
ratified 14 bilateral and regional FTAs and had negotiated but not implemented another seven (see 
table 3). Asian nations are also actively negotiating some 23 bilateral and regional FTAs, many with 
non-Asian partners, including Australia (a country that often thinks of itself as Asian), Canada, Chile, 
the European Union, India, and Qatar (see table 3).  
Since 2000, China has been particularly active by completing three bilateral FTAs—Thailand 
in 2003 and Hong Kong and Macao in 20046—and initiating another 17 bilateral and regional FTAs 
(see table 4). Since 2000, it has negotiated eight FTAs (three regional and five bilateral) and proposed 
another nine (two regional and seven bilateral).  
Why is China pursuing FTAs? Seemingly for a blend of foreign policy and economic 
reasons, much like the United States and the European Union. Regional and bilateral talks offer a 
more efficient forum for liberalizing trade than the WTO, where agreements require a consensus of 
148 sovereign nations. Asian FTAs also enable China to confirm its commitment to trade 
liberalization and acquire negotiating experience before defining a leadership role in the WTO. 
Economically, FTAs provide a framework to maintain an open trading system and minimize the 
likelihood of outright supply shortages in the event of commodity price spikes. Politically, FTAs can 
be an important tool of commercial diplomacy to institutionalize economic partnerships. China also 
uses FTAs, such as the ASEAN-China FTA, first proposed by former Premier Zhu Rongji in 2000, 





                                                 
5 In September 2004, former EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy cautioned Singapore that an EU-Singapore 
FTA was not in the cards because the European Union places first priority on multilateral liberalization under 
the WTO. If that fails, the European Union focuses on regional FTAs, such as a possible ASEAN-EU 
agreement. See Vikram Khanna, “EU Paving Way for Eventual FTA with ASEAN,” Business Times Singapore, 
September 8, 2004.  
6 Of these three completed FTAs, only two, with Hong Kong and Macao, have entered into force.  
  3CHINA’S ECONOMIC INFLUENCE  
 
Thanks to an average annual growth rate of 9 percent over the past 25 years, China has emerged as 
an economic power. Correspondingly, China is now the dominant economic force in East Asia, 
where intraregional trade has grown faster than in other areas of the world economy. China is also 
the world’s largest recipient of foreign direct investment, and much of the investment is aimed at 
export-oriented production. As a consequence of its trade and investment policies, China exemplifies 
the classic story of triangular commerce: exporting finished and semi-finished manufactures, while 
importing raw materials, semi-finished components, and capital goods.7 China’s trade surplus with 
the United States was $162 billion in 2004 and with the European Union, $98 billion, but it runs 
persistent trade deficits with several Asian countries, including Indonesia ($1 billion), Australia ($1 
billion), Japan ($15 billion), Korea ($23 billion), Malaysia ($8 billion), Taiwan ($40 billion), and 
Thailand ($5 billion) (see table 5).8  
While Chinese import markets provide the economic spark for much of Asia, Chinese 
exports offer fierce competition in third-country markets. Imports are concentrated in raw and semi-
finished materials and capital goods; export competition is most keen in finished manufactures. 
China’s share of total exports from newly industrialized economies (Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, 
and Taiwan) increased from about 8 percent in 1990 to 15 percent in 1997 to nearly 20 percent in 
2002 (Krumm and Kharas 2003). ASEAN is now the fourth largest supplier of raw materials to 
China.  
 
CHINA AND FTA INITIATIVES 
 
In economic terms, China’s choice of FTA partners (after Hong Kong and Macao) foremost reflects 
China’s demand for raw commodities (see table 5). China’s pursuit of FTAs thus extends from the 
Gulf Cooperation Council to Brazil and Australia.9 China is currently the second largest consumer 
and importer of petroleum, and its demand for crude oil is expected to grow by 4 percent annually 
over the next decade. In fact, bilateral trade with Australia is booming because of Chinese 
consumption of commodities, especially crude oil, natural gas, copper, and iron ore, which accounted 
                                                 
7 According to Goldman Sachs, nearly 80 percent of intraregional exports to China are intermediate and capital 
goods and raw materials. See Zebregs (2004) and Ng and Yeats (2003).  
8 The cited figures are based on the US International Trade Commission (USITC) Interactive Tariff and Trade 
Dataweb and the European Union Eurostat databases. Note the statistical discrepancy between Chinese and 
non-Chinese trade sources. For example, table 4 is based on the UN Comtrade database, which reports 
Chinese trade statistics and suggests that official US and European figures may overstate bilateral trade deficits 
with China.  
9 Raw material imports dominate Chinese imports from potential FTA partners, ranging from 72 percent with 
Brazil to 89 percent with Australia and reaching 100 percent with Gulf countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates). See table 5.  
  4for most of Australia’s $1 billion trade surplus with China in 2003 (see table 5). By 2003, the Chinese 
state-owned petroleum company, China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), had invested 
about $652 million in Australia’s Gorgon liquefied natural gas (LNG) project in Western Australia. In 
the same year, CNOOC invested $348 million to supply 3 million tons of LNG annually to a 
terminal in the Guangdong province.10 Hence it is not surprising that Australia has become a 
potential FTA partner.  
Chinese trade pacts vary from highly concrete terms in the Hong Kong Closer Economic 
Partnership Agreement (CEPA) of 2004 to broad aspirations set forth in the Australia and New 
Zealand initial framework agreements (seen as templates for FTAs with other industrialized 
countries).11 China evidently prefers a pragmatic approach, served by customized FTAs that take into 
account particular bilateral or regional commercial and strategic interests. Unlike the United States, 
China does not strive to create a template for WTO agreements, nor does it seem to think that each 
FTA will necessarily serve as a model for the next. Chinese FTAs are less comprehensive than US 
FTAs in that they typically exclude dispute settlement mechanisms, intellectual property, special 
sectoral arrangements, environment, and labor. Instead, Chinese FTAs focus primarily on liberalizing 
trade in goods and services.12 Several FTAs are compared below.  
 
Hong Kong CEPA.    The Hong Kong CEPA, which entered into force in January 2004, is the 
most comprehensive Chinese FTA. (China likewise concluded a Macao CEPA, which also entered 
into force in January 2004 and is nearly identical to the Hong Kong CEPA.) The Hong Kong 
agreement, which  is only about 13 pages,  outlines a phaseout schedule for tariff and nontariff 
barriers on goods, liberalizes services, and promotes trade and investment. CEPA rules of origin 
require that, to be eligible for zero tariffs, Hong Kong exports must contain at least 30 percent local 
value added content (raw materials, labor costs, and product development costs).13 Given that Hong 
Kong was already among the freest economies in the world, the CEPA entailed a one-sided 
concession from China to unilaterally reduce tariffs on imports to zero by 2006.14 Moreover, since 
                                                 
10 See “China’s CNOOC’s Australia LNG Deal,” Xinhua Financial Network News, October 24, 2003.  
11 Similarly, the United States uses Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs) as a “warm-up” 
device for FTAs.  
12 The most comprehensive liberalization of services is outlined under the Hong Kong and Macao CEPAs. 
Bilateral services liberalization includes the following sectors: financial services, banking, insurance, securities, 
management consulting, advertising, accounting, real estate and construction, logistics, shipping, 
telecommunications, legal services, and tourism.  
13 See Hong Kong CEPA, Annex 2, available at 
www.tid.gov.hk/english/aboutus/tradecircular/all_in_one/2003/as582003.html (accessed on May 30, 2005).  
14 The Hong Kong CEPA was initially proposed to help boost Hong Kong’s economy, which suffered two 
recessions and a prolonged downturn. Under the Hong Kong CEPA, China pledges to reduce tariffs to zero 
on 273 product categories by January 2004, including medicines and toys; all other tariffs will be eliminated by 
January 2006, including food, chemical, and electronic products. See the Hong Kong CEPA main text, available 
at www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepa/trade_goods.html (accessed on May 30, 2005).  
  5the rule of origin is relatively liberal, Hong Kong will become the port of entry for semi-finished 
components entering China. Under the CEPA, the share of Hong Kong goods exported to China 
tariff-free will jump from 20 to 90 percent. Apart from being free from antidumping (AD) or 
countervailing duty (CVD) actions by Hong Kong, China gained little mercantilistic advantage from 
the CEPA.  
Compared with other bilateral FTAs, the CEPA provides unique opportunities to Hong 
Kong service providers, who gained preferential access to Chinese markets by January 2004 instead 
of December 2007 (the date committed in China’s WTO accession agreement). Service firms that 
meet the qualifications for being a “Hong Kong service supplier” under the CEPA thus have a key 
time advantage over third-country competitors.15 Under the terms of its WTO accession, China 
requires minimum assets of $20 billion for overseas financial institutions to establish branches in 
China. However, under the CEPA, the minimum asset requirement for a Hong Kong financial 
institution is only $6 billion. China gave few concessions to other WTO members in legal services. 
By contrast, under the CEPA, Chinese law firms can employ Hong Kong barristers or solicitors and 
Hong Kong law firms can establish representative offices in China that operate in association with 
mainland law firms.  
Although there appear to be few mercantilistic gains for China under the CEPA, China will 
enjoy the substantial economic benefit of greater competition from Hong Kong suppliers of goods 
and particularly services. Moreover, there are long-term political benefits. By using Hong Kong (and 
to a lesser extent Macao) as successful examples of “One Country, Two Systems,” China may 
demonstrate an acceptable pattern for integrating Taiwan into the “Greater China Economic Circle” 
(see Wang 2004).  
 
ASEAN FTA.    In 2000, former Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji proposed a bilateral ASEAN-
China FTA. In 2002, China and ASEAN countries concluded a framework for the FTA, which 
includes an agreement to remove tariffs on all goods by 2015. Known as the Framework Agreement 
on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation, China and the original ASEAN members (Brunei, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) agreed to implement zero tariffs by 2010 
and with newer ASEAN members (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam) by 2015. The ASEAN-
China FTA is still a work in progress and has not yet been notified to the WTO. 
There are strong economic incentives for the ASEAN-China FTA. In 2005, ASEAN 
became China’s fourth largest trading partner, after the European Union, the United States, and 
                                                 
15 Several criteria are used to determine whether a firm qualifies as a Hong Kong service supplier. Along with 
other requirements, the firm must be established in Hong Kong for no less than three years (five years for 
construction, banking, and insurance services) and pay profit taxes, and more than 50 percent of the staff must 
be permanent Hong Kong residents. See Hong Kong CEPA, Annex 5, available at 
www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepa/fulltext.html (accessed on May 30, 2005).  
  6Japan. Since bilateral trade with China currently represents just 3 percent of total ASEAN exports 
and 5 percent of ASEAN imports, it is expected to grow rapidly.16 Studies estimate that the ASEAN-
China FTA might increase bilateral trade by 50 percent, with Chinese exports to ASEAN increasing 
by 55 percent and ASEAN exports to China increasing by 48 percent (ASEAN Secretariat 2002).17 
These estimates may be conservative, since gravity model coefficients suggest that an FTA can 
double trade between the partners (DeRosa and Gilbert 2005, table 1). Eventually, the ASEAN-
China FTA might become the world’s largest free trade area with intraregional trade totaling $1.2 
trillion.  
ASEAN firms face competition from Chinese companies in third-country markets 
(especially the United States, the European Union, and Japan) and domestic markets in products 
ranging from labor-intensive manufacturing (textiles, footwear, and toys) to high technology (chip 
manufacturing). For example, ASEAN textile and apparel firms must compete openly with Chinese 
firms in Japan, where the Chinese market share of cotton knit apparel jumped from about 47 percent 
in 1996 to 77 percent in 2001 (Pangestu and Gooptu 2003). 
Under the FTA, China will benefit from better access to ASEAN’s 410 million consumers 
and more assured supplies of raw commodities and food. The FTA could also be an important 
vehicle for attracting Chinese FDI into Southeast Asia. ASEAN represents just 20 percent of total 
Chinese outward FDI, a share that could grow significantly. For reasons of natural resource security, 
Chinese firms are already investing in fuels and minerals. In 2002, CNOOC paid $584 million to 
acquire Spanish oil company Repsol-YPF, largely for its Indonesian oil and gas assets. The Chinese 
government is aggressively encouraging Chinese companies to invest and bid for engineering and 
construction projects in ASEAN economies, partly to access commodities.  
A key aspect that makes the ASEAN-China FTA proposal more attractive to ASEAN 
countries, by comparison with Japanese and South Korean initiatives, is the Early Harvest program, 
which aims to reduce tariffs on most goods to less than 5 percent during 2004–10. Specifically, all 
parties will eliminate tariffs on eight categories of agricultural products by 2010. 18 Tariffs on other 
sensitive goods, including sugar, iron, steel, and cars, will be reduced to less than 20 percent by 2012. 
The FTA’s Early Harvest program thus gives ASEAN exporters, especially agricultural producers, a 
significant advantage over other WTO members. After tariffs on Chinese imports of fruits and 
vegetables were eliminated, Chinese imports from ASEAN increased by 39 percent within the first 
                                                 
16 Based on total exports and imports between China and original ASEAN members, known as ASEAN-6.  
17 Moreover, according to the ASEAN Secretariat (2002), the ASEAN-China FTA would increase GDP by 0.9 
percent in ASEAN and by 3 percent in China.  
18 Agricultural products eligible under the Early Harvest program include live animals, meat, fish, dairy 
products, other animal products, live trees, edible vegetables, and edible fruits and nuts. Moreover, under the 
program, quotas and quantitative restrictions will be replaced by tariffs on other agricultural products, such as 
palm oil, rice, and sugar. Concerned about competition from Chinese agricultural imports, the Philippines is the 
only country not participating in the program.  
  7six months of 2004. During the same period, Thai vegetable exports to China increased by 38 
percent and fruit exports jumped by 80 percent.19 While the ASEAN-China FTA has yet to address 
sensitive issues, such as Chinese restrictions on palm oil imports, the pact has helped mitigate 
commercial fears of Chinese dominance.  
 
New Zealand FTA.20    The New Zealand Trade and Economic Cooperation Framework 
Agreement (TECF), signed in May 2004, represents a general statement of economic intent rather 
than a concrete agreement to liberalize trade.21 Under Annex 1, the TECF enumerates specific areas 
for future cooperation, including in agriculture, forestry, environmental protection, and intellectual 
property rights.22  
The TECF paved the way for FTA negotiations, which began in 2005. China is New 
Zealand’s fourth largest trading partner, and New Zealand is expected to make significant economic 
gains with the bilateral FTA. Based on New Zealand statistics (which differ sharply from Chinese 
statistics), in 2004, New Zealand merchandise exports to China (mostly dairy and other agricultural 
products) reached $1.7 billion, and services exports totaled $1.1 billion.23 Chinese merchandise 
exports to New Zealand were about $3.4 billion in 2004 (based on New Zealand statistics), mostly 
textiles and apparel, footwear, electronics, and manufacturing goods. Economic models (Joint Study 
Report 2004) suggest that the FTA will increase New Zealand goods and services exports between 20 
and 39 percent over a 20-year period (2007–27), translating into an annual average increase of 
between $180 million to $280 million. Again, gravity models suggest that these estimates are too 
conservative (DeRosa and Gilbert 2005). New Zealand stands to make the largest gains in agriculture 
(especially dairy), fruits and vegetables, and processed food.24 However, China is particularly wary 
that agricultural trade liberalization would adversely affect its farmers, especially in the dairy sector. 
                                                 
19 The Early Harvest proposal also benefits poorer ASEAN countries (Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam) by 
including technical assistance and extending most-favored nation treatment of China’s WTO accession 
commitments to non-WTO members. 
20 China also signed a Trade and Economic Framework with Australia in October 2003, and the proposed 
bilateral Australia-China FTA is nearly identical to the New Zealand FTA.  
21 The objectives of the New Zealand TECF are particularly vague, including objectives to “lay foundations for 
future economic and trade cooperation” between China and New Zealand. See New Zealand Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (2005). While there is no negotiating deadline, the FTA is expected to be 
implemented by January 2007. See Fran O’Sullivan, “China Keen for Wide Trade Deal,” New Zealand Herald, 
June 1, 2005.  
22 The TECF also includes a mutual pledge to reduce technical barriers to trade and encourage New Zealand 
firms to provide training, investment, and trade opportunities in the poorer northeastern and western Chinese 
provinces.  
23 Based on Statistics New Zealand (2005), which are different than UN Comtrade figures (derived from 
Chinese trade data) reported in table 4.   
24 Based on the Joint China–New Zealand Feasibility Study, which uses a dynamic CGE model. New Zealand 
currently faces high Chinese import tariffs on agricultural products ranging from milk powder (10 percent) to 
kiwi fruit (20 percent). Out-of-quota wool exports face duties of 38 percent. For its manufactured exports, 
New Zealand would benefit from lower tariffs in specific products, including fridge-freezer and air-conditioner 
units. See New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade  (2005).  
  8Similarly, Chinese officials are concerned that agriculture could remain a stumbling block in ongoing 
FTA negotiations with Australia.25
By contrast, the FTA will provide China with comparatively small export opportunities. The 
joint New Zealand FTA feasibility study estimates Chinese exports to New Zealand will increase by 
between 5 and 11 percent over the same 20-year period (2007–27), translating into an average annual 
increase of between $37 million and $66 million. Again, it must be emphasized that such ex ante 
forecasts of trade gains from an FTA, based on computable general equilibrium (CGE) models, are 
often wide off the mark (DeRosa and Gilbert 2005).  
Forecasts aside, why is China interested in an FTA with New Zealand? China is keen on 
using the New Zealand FTA to position itself as a free trader when negotiating FTAs with larger 
industrial countries. Moreover, since the FTA will result in zero tariffs, China plans to use the FTA 
to advance domestic economic reforms. The FTA is particularly attractive because New Zealand is 
the first industrialized country to grant China market economy status. By recognizing China as a 
market economy, New Zealand agrees to waive discriminatory AD measures under Sections 15, 16, 
or paragraph 242 of China’s WTO accession protocol. Instead, New Zealand will apply the same AD 
and CVD methodology that it applies to other WTO members.26
 
PAN-ASIAN FTA  
 
Former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad first proposed the idea of an Asian economic 
bloc in 1990. In response, former US Secretary of State James Baker dismissed the Mahathir proposal 
for “drawing a line down the Pacific” and instead proposed APEC. Yet Mahathir’s vision was 
realized in 1993—in watered-down form and with different political overtones—through the 
ASEAN+3 cooperative framework, which includes the 10 ASEAN members and China, Japan, and 
South Korea.27  
                                                 
25 See Tracy Sutherland and John Breusch, “Textiles and Agriculture Will Be Sticking Points,” Australian 
Financial Review, April 20, 2005.  
26 AD measures based on the nonmarket economy methodology were pioneered by the United States in the 
1970s and are codified in the WTO Antidumping Code (technically known as the Agreement on 
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994). According to the New 
Zealand government, there is “no universally accepted definition of a ‘market economy’ ” and China “now has 
enough of the key characteristics of a ‘market economy’ to be regarded as one.” See New Zealand Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade  (2005, 2004). In April 2005, Australia became the second industrial country to grant 
China market economy status. Like New Zealand, Australia waived its right to apply discriminatory AD and 
safeguard measures against China as outlined under the Chinese WTO accession protocol. See Australia 
Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, “Market Economy Status,” available at 
www.dfat.gov.au/geo/china/fta/facts/market_economy.html (accessed on June 1, 2005).  
27 The ASEAN+3 has been holding regular meetings of its finance ministers since 1998 and plans to hold the 
first East Asia Summit in 2005. Other proposals to promote Asian economic regionalism include a docking 
mechanism within a web of Japanese bilateral agreements. For example, China and ASEAN would be included 
in a bilateral Japan-Korea FTA. See Evenett, Venables, and Winters (2004). 
  9Unlike the sequence followed by the European Union and NAFTA, Asian financial 
integration has actually preceded trade cooperation. The ASEAN+3 swap arrangement, known as the 
Chiang Mai initiative, served as the precursor for expanding trade and financial cooperation. 
Established in 2000, the Chiang Mai proposal is based on a network of bilateral currency swap 
arrangements intended to provide a bulwark against a future Asian financial crisis. In May 2005, the 
ASEAN+3 finance ministers agreed to at least double their initial $39.5 billion currency swap 
arrangements.28 The Chiang Mai initiative is thus seen as the first step in the creation of an Asian 
Monetary Fund (AMF). As much as anything, the AMF concept is inspired by resentment over US-
EU dominance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the perceived mismanagement of the 
1997–98 Asian financial crisis.  
A regional Asian FTA that includes two highly protected sectors—agriculture and services—
could lead to significant economic benefits. However, the core gains, and the biggest obstacles, are to 
be found in Northeast Asia—an FTA that links China, Japan, and Korea. According to one estimate 
(again probably conservative), a Northeast Asian FTA would raise Chinese GDP by more than 2 
percent (Scollay and Gilbert 2001).  
While a pan-Asian FTA that encompasses Northeast Asia would have significant economic 
payoff, it faces enormous hurdles. Japan and South Korea are strongly opposed to removing 
agricultural barriers. Historic animosity and possible military rivalry between Japan and China also 




So far there is little evidence that the FTA process—whatever its shortcomings—is leading to a 
three-bloc configuration of the world economy. To be sure, the European Union is an economic 
bloc, but its “out-of-area” FTAs do not add up to an EU-centered bloc. While the United States is 
the anchor of FTAs in the Western Hemisphere, including NAFTA, CAFTA-DR, and the Free 
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), currently it is most actively engaged in concluding multiple 
FTAs in the Middle East. Moreover, the FTAA project is not doing well at the moment.  
The ASEAN-China FTA is probably the most ambitious and active initiative in East Asia. 
However, in addition to ASEAN-China, about eight regional agreements are associated with 
                                                 
28 East Asian governments also agreed to double the share of emergency funds that could be disbursed, without 
the recipient government implementing an IMF program, from 10 to 20 percent. See Victor Mallet, “Support 
Deal ‘Could Become Asian IMF’,” Financial Times, May 6, 2005; and Hae Won Choi, “Swap Arrangements By 
Central Banks To Aid Liquidity,” Asian Wall Street Journal, May 30, 2005.  
29 While visiting Japan in May 2005, Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi proposed a bilateral FTA. But bilateral 
relations reached a historic 30-year low when he abruptly cancelled a meeting with Japanese Prime Minister 
Koizumi over Koizumi’s visits to the controversial Yasukuni war shrine.  
  10ASEAN.30 Excluding ASEAN-related FTAs, Asian countries initiated some 74 regional and bilateral 
FTAs; and Asian countries also participate in about 59 FTAs with non-Asian partners.31 As a result, 
the impression that East Asian countries are forming a contiguous, regional bloc is, for the moment, 
misleading.  
As mentioned earlier, China is an active player in the FTA game. However, only two of its 
FTAs, with Hong Kong and Macao, have been implemented, and new FTA proposals on the 
drawing board are not as comprehensive. If China manages to successfully implement FTAs with 
significant goods and services liberalization, the agreements would give a strong push to regional 
liberalization. At this writing, a regional Asian economic bloc led by China seems distant, even 
though China accounts for about 30 percent of regional GDP. Moreover, as in Europe and the 
Western Hemisphere, many Asian countries are pursuing FTAs with countries outside the region (see 
table 3).  
Despite the political obstacles, booming Asian intraregional trade suggests there are strong 
reasons for greater policy coordination, perhaps through a pan-Asian FTA. During 1975–2001, East 
Asian intraregional trade far outpaced intraregional trade in the European Union or NAFTA, 
growing by about 16 percent per year. In emerging Asia, the contribution of intraindustry trade 
expansion to total expansion increased from about 43 percent in 1986–90 to 75 percent in 1996–
2000.32 By 2003, the intraregional trade ratio in East Asia was about 53 percent, which is higher than 
NAFTA (45 percent) and catching up to the European Union (60 percent) (Iwao 2005). 
As is commonly known, GDP growth among the core EU countries is anemic. The 
European Central Bank recently cut its growth forecast for the European Union to between 1.1 and 
1.7 percent.33 The recent rejection of the EU constitutional treaty by France and the Netherlands 
suggests that political unity in the European Union is a distant proposition (Shell International Ltd. 
2005). A single European voice on foreign policy and a pan-European military force are both remote. 
A looming if low-probability economic concern is a crisis in the euro area as Italy approaches 
national bankruptcy. Thus, while the European Union has successfully enlarged its economic 
membership to include ten peripheral economies, as a political venture the European Union faces 
significant obstacles.  
                                                 
30 ASEAN-related FTAs and financial integration measures include ASEAN, ASEAN+CER, ASEAN-Japan, 
ASEAN-Korea, ASEAN-China, ASEAN+3, and the Chiang Mai initiative (see table 3).  
31 Asian FTAs are based on East and Southeast Asian partners. Non-Asian FTAs include South Asian (India 
and Pakistan) and Pacific partners (Australia and New Zealand).  
32 Emerging Asia includes China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Taiwan, and Thailand. See Zebregs (2004).  
33 German GDP is expected to grow by only 1.1 percent in 2005. In France, more than one worker in ten is 
unemployed.  
  11In the post-NAFTA era, US trade with Canada and Mexico has grown twice as fast as US 
trade with the rest of the world.34 The past decade has been prosperous in the United States and 
Canada. Mexico has not performed nearly up to its potential but, after the peso crisis, Mexico did 
better than most of Latin America. Putting the economic benefits of regional integration aside, 
political differences divide North America, ranging from the lack of Canadian and Mexican support 
for the Iraq war to the absence of an immigration accord. Prospects for concluding a trade and 
investment bloc in the Western Hemisphere through other FTAs, notably the FTAA, are not 
assured. Even if the FTAA is concluded, it certainly does not portend a political bloc organized 
around Washington.  
To conclude, on present evidence, the FTA process embraced with some enthusiasm in 
Asia, Europe, and the Western Hemisphere more closely resembles fingers reaching idiosyncratically 
around the globe than the formation of politico-economic blocs centered respectively on Beijing, 





                                                 
34 For more details about the economic gains from NAFTA, see chapter 1 of Hufbauer and Schott (2005) and 
Pastor (2004).  
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Table 1   Implemented, negotiated, and proposed FTAs: United States, 1985–2005    
      
  





of US total 
two-way 
trade 
        
Implemented        
Israel Bilateral  1985  17,336  0.9
Canada, Mexico  Regional (NAFTA)  1994  593,072  31.2
Jordan Bilateral  2001  1,153  0.1
Chile Bilateral  2004  6,422  0.3
Morocco Bilateral  2004  859  0.0
Singapore Bilateral  2004  29,180  1.5
Australia Bilateral  2005  18,918  1.0
Central America3 Regional (CAFTA-DR)  2005  31,233  1.6
      Subtotal     698,182  35.1
        
Negotiated but not implemented4       
   Bahrain  Bilateral  2004  875  0.0
    Subtotal     32,109  1.7
        
Proposed 5       
Asia Pacific6 Regional (APEC)  1989  1,230,160  64.7
Canada, Mexico, Central America,  Regional  (FTAA)  1994  716,023  37.7
     Caribbean, South America7       
ASEAN8 Regional (EAI)  2002  122,416  6.4
Middle East9 Regional (MEFTA)  2003  54  0.0
Southern Africa10 Regional (SACU)  2003  8,343  0.4
Andean Nations11 Regional 2004  37,478  2.0
Colombia Bilateral  2004  9,842  0.5
Egypt Bilateral  2004  3,766  0.2
Korea Bilateral  2004  59,455  3.1
Oman Bilateral  2004  924  0.0
Panama Bilateral  2004  1,989  0.1
Sri Lanka  Bilateral  2004  1,950  0.1
Thailand Bilateral  2004  20,474  1.1
Caribbean Basin12 Bilateral 2005  11,231  0.6
Malaysia Bilateral  2005  35,445  1.9
New Zealand  Bilateral  2005  4,135  0.2
United Arab Emirates  Bilateral  2005  4,455  0.2






     
  15Table 1 (continued) 
    
1. Regional initiative free trade agreements (FTAs) refer to plans for partner countries to gradually increase  
   trade and investment with the United States: first through trade and investment frameworks agreements (TIFAs), 
followed by bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and comprehensive FTAs. As an example, one US objective is to 
establish the Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA) by 2013.     
2. For implemented FTAs, date is based on when the agreement was entered into force. For FTAs under   
negotiation, date is based on when negotiations began.      
3. Central American partners in CAFTA-DR include: Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, and Nicaragua.    
4. Represents FTAs that have been signed but not yet entered into force.   
5. Includes FTAs that are under negotiation but not yet signed or entered into force.    
6. Asia Pacific partners under APEC include Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile; China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan,   





7. South American partners under the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) include Antigua and Barbuda, 
Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and 
Venezuela.   
8. ASEAN partners under the Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative (EAI) include Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia,   
Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.   
9. Middle Eastern partners involved in the MEFTA include Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco,   
Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Yemen.  
10. South African partners under the proposed Southern African Customs Union (SACU) FTA include Botswana, Lesotho, 
Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland.   
11. Andean partners include Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.   
  12. Caribbean Basin partners include Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, 
Jamaica, Montserrat, Saint Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.   
 






























  16Table 2  Implemented, negotiated, and proposed FTAs: European Union, 1994–2005 
 
Partner country  Type of FTA1 Year2  
      
Implemented      
Europe3 Regional (EEA)  1994   
Tunisia Bilateral  (AA)  1998   
Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific4 Regional EPA (ACP)  2000   
Mexico Bilateral  2000   
Morocco Bilateral  (AA)  2000   
Jordan Bilateral  (AA)  2002   
Chile Bilateral  (AA)  2003   
Lebanon Bilateral  (AA)  2003   
Macedonia Bilateral  (SAA)  2004   
Croatia Bilateral  (SAA)  2005   
      
Negotiated but not implemented5  
Palestine Bilateral  (AA)  1997   
Algeria Bilateral  (AA)  2002   
Syria Bilateral  (AA)  2004   
      
Proposed 6   
Mediterranean7 Regional (EMFTA)  1995 
Gulf Cooperation Council8 Regional (GCC)  1999   
South Africa9 Bilateral 2000   
South America10 Regional (Mercosur)  2000   
Singapore Bilateral  2002   
Albania Bilateral  (SAA)  2003   
Central America  Regional  2003   
India Bilateral  2003   
Peru Bilateral  2003   
Russia Bilateral  2003   
Andean11 Regional (AA)  2004   
Egypt Bilateral  (AA)  2004   
Southeast Asia12 Regional (ASEAN)  2004   
      
    
  1. AA refers to European Association Agreements, which are similar to US bilateral or regional free trade 
agreements (FTAs). SAA refers to European Stabilization and Association Agreements that replaced bilateral 
FTAs between the EU and southeast European countries.   
2. For implemented FTAs, date is based on when the agreement was entered into force. For all other agreements 
under negotiation, date is based on when negotiations began, or when framework agreements were signed. 
3. EEA refers to the European Economic Area Agreement, which extended the EU Single Market legislation to Iceland,  
Liechenstein, and Norway. 
4. Includes 78 signatories based in west Africa, central Africa, southern Africa, and the Caribbean Pacific. 
5. Represents FTAs that have been signed but not yet entered into force. 
                                                                                                                                                                           (table continues next page) 
 
   
  17Table 2 (continued) 
 
  6. Includes FTAs that are under negotiation but not yet signed or entered into force.  
  7. EMFTA refers to the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area, or an agreement to establish an FTA between the European Union 
  and 12 countries by 2010, including Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Palestinian Authority,      
Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey. 
  8. Gulf Cooperation Council  (GCC) includes the following partners: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United  
       Arab Emirates. 
  9. EU-South Africa FTA is partially implemented on certain goods, pending the establishment of a comprehensive FTA by 2012.
10. Mercosur countries include Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay.  
11. Andean partners include Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela. 
12. ASEAN partners include Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand,  
      and Vietnam. 
 
Note: EU bilateral and regional trade agreements are not as comprehensive as the United States'.  Most FTAs are labeled as 
Association Agreements, which sometimes excludes free trade in services and investment. Note however, that this table does 
not include European Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries. EPAs seek 
to establish a more reciprocal relationship than existed under the previous Lome accords (1975) which eventually transforms 
into an FTA. Currently there are 78 ACP countries under EPAs. Including EPAs would thus raise the total number of EU FTAs 
from 26 to 104. 
 








































  18Table 3   Implemented, negotiated, and proposed FTAs: Asia (except China and Taiwan),  
                   1992–2005 
          
Asian country or   Partner(s)  Type of FTA  Year       
regional grouping               
             
Implemented             
AFTA (ASEAN FTA) 
 
Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam  Regional      
                  
India Nepal  Bilateral  1991        
India Sri  Lanka Bilateral  1999        
                 
Japan Mexico  Bilateral  2005        
                 
Korea Chile  Bilateral  2004        
                 
Singapore New  Zealand  Bilateral  2001        
Singapore Japan  Bilateral  2002        
Singapore Jordan  Bilateral  2005        
Singapore Australia  Bilateral  2003        
Singapore 
Switzerland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, 
and Norway (EFTA)  Regional 2003        
Singapore United  States  Bilateral  2004        
                 
Thailand Australia  Bilateral  2005        
Thailand Laos  Bilateral  1991        
Thailand New  Zealand  Bilateral  2005        
         
Negotiated but not yet implemented
1        
         
India Mercosur2 Regional 2005        
                 
Korea 
Switzerland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, 
and Norway (EFTA)  Regional 2005        
                 
             
SAFTA 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, 
Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan,  
and Sri Lanka  Regional  2004        
                 
Singapore India  Bilateral  2005        
Singapore Korea  Bilateral  2005        
Singapore Pakistan  Bilateral  2005        
                 
Sri Lanka  Pakistan  Bilateral  2005        
                 
   (table continues next page)      
             
  19 
 
Table 3 (continued)             
             
Asian country or  
regional grouping  Partner(s)  Type of FTA  Year        
Under negotiation 
3            
             
ASEAN India  Regional  2003        
ASEAN Japan  Regional  2005        
ASEAN Korea  Regional  2005        
ASEAN+CER4
Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam + 
Australia, New Zealand  Regional  2005        
                 
Hong Kong  New Zealand  Bilateral  2001        
                 
India Chile  Bilateral  2004        
                 
Japan Indonesia Bilateral  2005        
Japan Malaysia  Bilateral  2005        
Japan Philippines  Bilateral  2004        
Japan Thailand  Bilateral  2004        
                 
Korea Canada  Bilateral  2005        
Korea Japan  Bilateral  2003        
                 
Malaysia Australia  Bilateral  2005        
Malaysia New  Zealand  Bilateral  2005        
Malaysia Pakistan  Bilateral  2005        
                 
Singapore Canada  Bilateral  2001        
Singapore Mexico  Bilateral  2000        
Singapore Peru  Bilateral  2005        
Singapore Qatar  Bilateral  2004        
                 
Thailand Bahrain  Bilateral  2002        
Thailand India  Bilateral  2003        
Thailand Peru  Bilateral  2004        
Thailand United  States  Bilateral  2004        
             
Trial balloons 
5            
ASEAN +3  
Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam + 
China, Japan, Korea  Regional  2001        
           
East Asia FTA  China, Japan, Korea  Regional  2002        
                 
                       (table continues next page)      
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Table 3 (continued)             
             
Asian country or  
regional grouping  Partner(s)  Type of FTA  Year        
India Mexico  Bilateral  2004        
             
Indonesia United  States Bilateral  2005        
                 
Japan Australia  Bilateral  2005        
Japan Canada  Bilateral  2004        
Japan Chile  Bilateral  2005        
                 
Korea Australia  Bilateral  2000        
Korea India  Bilateral  2005        
Korea Mercosur  Regional 2005        
Korea Mexico  Bilateral  2002        
Korea New  Zealand  Bilateral  2000        
Korea Thailand  Bilateral  2003        
Korea United  States  Bilateral  2005        
             
Malaysia  European Union   Bilateral  2005        
Malaysia India  Bilateral  2005        
Malaysia United  States  Bilateral  2004        
                 
Pacific 5 
United States, Chile, Australia,  
New Zealand, and Singapore  Regional  1998        
                 
Pakistan United  States  Bilateral  2005        
                 
Singapore Bahrain  Bilateral  2003        
Singapore Egypt  Bilateral  2004        
Singapore Kuwait  Bilateral  2004        
Singapore Panama  Bilateral  2004        
Singapore Sri  Lanka  Bilateral  2003        
Singapore  United Arab Emirates  Bilateral  2005        
                 
Thailand Israel  Bilateral  2005        
Thailand Pakistan  Bilateral  2005        
ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
EFTA = European Free Trade Association 
SAFTA = South Asia Free Trade Association 
SEP = Strategic Economic Partnership 
 
1. Represents FTAs that have been signed but not yet entered into force. 
2. Mercosur partners include full members (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) and 
associate members (Chile, Bolivia, Peru, Venezuela, and possibly Mexico).        
3. Represents the year when formal negotiations began.       
4. CER: Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Partnership. 
5. Represents informal intergovernmental talks or government-sponsored studies preliminary to 
negotiation and includes proposals made by at least one responsible government official 
for discussion or study. 
 
 
Sources: Krumm and Kharas (2003); personal communication with Noboru Hatakeyama, 2005.   
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Table 4  Implemented, negotiated and proposed FTAs: China, 1989–2005 
 
      




   Percent of  
  China total 
two-way trade 
Implemented   
Hong Kong, Macao2 Bilateral  2004                   88,859        10.4 
      
Negotiated but not implemented3   
Thailand  Bilateral  2003                   12,655           1.5 
        
Proposed4       
Asia Pacific5 Regional (APEC)  1989                 596,882         70.1 
East Asia  Regional (Japan,  2000                 284,173         33.4 
 Korea,  China)       
Southeast Asia  Regional (ASEAN)  2002                   78,254           9.2 
Brazil  Bilateral  2004                     7,986           0.9 
Gulf Cooperation Council6 Regional (GCC)  2004                   16,876           2.0 
India  Bilateral  2004                     7,595           0.9 
Mexico  Bilateral  2004                     4,944           0.6 
New Zealand7 Bilateral  2004                     1,826           0.2 
Peru  Bilateral  2004                     1,114           0.1 
Singapore  Bilateral  2004                   19,349           2.3 
South Africa  Regional (SACU)  2004                     4,015           0.5 
South America   Regional (Mercosur)  2004                   11,504           1.4 
Australia8 Bilateral  2005                   13,564           1.6 
Chile  Bilateral  2005                      3,532           0.4 
Iceland  Bilateral  2005                           68           0.0 
Japan  Bilateral  2005                 133,557         15.7 
Korea  Bilateral  2005                   63,223           7.4 
Pakistan  Bilateral  2005                     2,430           0.3 
    
1. For implemented free trade agreements (FTAs), date is based on when the agreement was entered into force or signed. 
For agreements under negotiation, date is based on when negotiations began, or when framework agreements were signed. 
2. Bilateral trade agreements with Hong Kong and Macau are known as Closer Economic Partnership Agreements (CEPAs). 
3. Represents FTAs that have been signed but not yet entered into force. 
4. Includes FTAs that are under negotiation but not yet signed or entered into force.  
5. Asia Pacific partners under APEC include Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea,  
Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
6. Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) includes the following partners: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United  
Arab Emirates. 
7. China signed a Trade and Economic Framework Agreement (TEFA) with New Zealand in May 2004. FTA negotiations began  
shortly after a joint feasibility study endorsed a bilateral New Zealand-China FTA in November 2004. 
8. Similar to the US Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs), China signed a TEFA with Australia in October 2003.  
After a joint feasibility study endorsed a Australia-China FTA, bilateral FTA negotiations are discussed. Australian Trade Minister  
Mark Vaile expressed confidence that a bilateral FTA would be completed by the end of 2007. 
 
Sources: Lincoln (2003), Antkiewicz and Whalley (2004), Krumm and Kharas (2003), various media reports, and UN Comtrade  
database (2005). 
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Table 5  China's trade with major partners, 2003 (in millions of dollars) 
                










Northeast Asia    
   Hong Kong  2,109  9,009  11,119    65,156 
   Japan  16,438  57,711  74,148    -14,739 
   Korea  14,068  29,060  43,128    -23,033 
   Macao  11  175  186    1,094 
   Taiwan  n.a.  n.a.  49,360    -40,356 
    Subtotal                 32,626  95,954  177,941    -11,879 
 (18)  (54)       
        
Southeast Asia (ASEAN)        
   Brunei*  312  0  312    -278 
   Cambodia*  14  12  26    269 
   Indonesia*  3,820  1,927  5,747    -1,265 
   Laos*  11  0  11    87 
   Malaysia  4,463  9,524  13,986    -7,845 
   Myanmar*  162  7  170    741 
   Philippines  490  5,817  6,307    -3,214 
   Singapore  3,956  6,529  10,485    -1,621 
   Thailand  3,919  4,908  8,827    -4,999 
   Vietnam*  1,305  147  1,457    1,726 
   Subtotal  18,451 28,872 47,327    -16,401 
 (39)  (61)       
          
South Asia         
   India*  3594  657  4251    -908 
   Pakistan  83  492  575    1,280 
    Subtotal  3,677 1,150 4,826    372 
  (76) (24)      
          
Pacific Asia         
   Australia*  6,490  810  7,300    -1,036 
   New Zealand*  868  156  1024    -221 
    Subtotal  7,358 966 8,324    -1,258 
  (88) (12)      
          
South America         
   Argentina*  2,565  164  2,729    -2,282 
   Brazil*  4,231  842  5,842    -3,699 
   Chile*  2,231  17  2,248    -965 
   Venezuela*  541  1  542    -343 
    Subtotal  9,568 1,024  11,362    -7,289 
  (84) (9)      
     (table  continues next page) 
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Table 5 (continued)      










Gulf States*  8,756  34  8,790    -704 
   (100)  (0)       
         
European Union         
   France  1,387  4,716  6,103    1,227 
   Germany  3,672  20,619  24,292    -6,850 
   Italy  922  4,159  5,081    1,572 
   Sweden  515  2,201  2,716    -1,888 
   United Kingdom   1,201  2,369  3,570    7,253 
     Subtotal  7,697 34,063  41,761    1,315 
Subtotal (European 
Union as a whole)  n.a. n.a.  53,017    19,115 
  (18) (82)       
         
Other          
   Russia*  8,240  1,488  9,728    -3,698 
  (85) (15)       
          
North America         
   Canada*  2,840  1,535  4,374    1,258 
   United States  14,458  19,486  33,944    58,682 
   Mexico  586  1,090  1,677    1,590 
   Subtotal              17,884 22,111 39,995    61,530 
  (45) (55)       
          
World   155,270 257,489 412,760    25,468 
  (38) (62)       
          
n.a. = not available        
*  Countries where raw material imports dominate trade (50 percent or more).    
 
Note: Figures in parentheses are share of total  imports in percent.    
       
Sources: Taiwan data are based on the China Statistical Yearbook (2004); data on all other countries are based  
on the United Nations Comtrade database (2005).    
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